Frequently Asked Questions
Where has eLect Today been “field-proven”? Where has it been used in public or private elections?
eLect Today uses our core eLect Platform, which has been used in elections all over the world including the 2007 Australian Parliamentary Election and in the 2008 U.S. Primary.
How is the voter authenticated? What about voter signature requirements? Does the voter have to have some type of electronic signature?
The voter is authenticated at the moment of ballot request, using credentials chosen by the election administrator. Typically these include voter name or ID number as well as a PIN (secret password) sent to the voter prior to the election.
In addition, when the voter returns the ballot by fax and/or mail, a voter signature can be required on the returned ballot.
The system does not require biometrics, special electronic ID devices, or smart cards.
Does the voter have to have some special software installed on their computer to use this system? Does eLect Today work with any web browser?
The only eLect Today technical requirement is an ordinary Web browser with Java capability, which is included standard on most computers and available for free download. Any ordinary printer can be used to print the blank or completed ballot (for fax or postal return). No other hardware or software is required.
Since the blank ballot will be encrypted on the way to the voter, how can we know the voter received the right ballot? How can you prove this?
The system maintains a complete database indicating which ballot is to be sent to which registered voter, and this database is used directly at the moment of ballot request. The database can be audited before, during, and after the election, as can the software code that accesses the database and sends the ballot.
Why should the voter trust that the bar code printed on the marked ballot is what they actually voted? Wouldn’t voters be more comfortable mailing/faxing/emailing the ballot they actually marked and can see in front of them on a piece of paper?
The election administrator is free to select a clear text ballot or an encrypted ballot. Many administrators will prefer the privacy provided by the encrypted bar code, while others may choose clear text despite the reduced voter privacy. We recommend the encrypted version for faxing, where privacy is a particular concern.
By recording the actual time a voter voted, can you then trace a vote back to a particular voter?
The paper ballot does not indicate the exact time of the vote. And as with any absentee ballot, the user is free to delay returning the ballot.
In my state, UOCAVA voters can email and fax voted ballots that can be seen by election personnel. In your decryption process, how do you prevent election personnel or observers from seeing how people voted their ballot? Doesn’t someone have to have the code to see these ballots so they can be printed and counted? How is that different from an election worker receiving a voted fax ballot or opening an email with a completed ballot?
Once a ballot is decrypted inside the tabulation center, identifying information is not included in the decrypted printout, so election personnel cannot associate the votes with a particular voter. Workers outside the tabulation center cannot read an encrypted ballot in transmission.
Optionally, eLect software can also aggregate the decrypted ballots inside the computer, printing only subtotals.
How does this system provide greater access for voters with disabilities? Can they listen to the ballot and cast them as they can on DREs in polling places?
eLect Today supports voters with screen-reading software.
How can these completed ballots be incorporated with other votes cast in the election? What device is needed to read ballots by paper or electronically? How are they counted/tabulated? Electronically? Or can they be counted by optical scanners already in use to count other absentee ballots? Do I have to have a special agreement with my current optical scan provider to count paper ballots produced by your system?
Depending on the method of counting system in use, eLect Today may be able to print compatible completed optical-scan ballots directly. For non-compatible counting systems, administrators may choose to manually transfer votes to compatible ballot forms, or to produce automated subtotals using the eLect tabulation software.
How do you prevent hacking or some type of spam or other attacks on the system? What about viruses and malicious code?
We have separate literature that describes the security of the Everyone Counts system. In short, each voter is authenticated, all online communication is encrypted, and each ballot received is signed digitally, by hand, or both.
Who has access to the digital ballot box? How is it secured?
The ballots in the digital ballot box are recorded using military-grade encryption formulas. Only authorized election officials with the necessary decryption codes can access the information.
What do you mean by “Open Code Advantage”? Can the programming code be given to anyone? If so, won’t you then be making public the special keys/code that can allow someone to see how a voter voted?
eLect programming code can be reviewed by any interested party. The keys are not part of the code; they are simply numbers (with many digits) that are generated differently for each election conducted. Access to the eLect code provides no ability to see the ballots without use of the keys, which are held by the elections officials. Even Everyone Counts technical personnel cannot read the encrypted ballots without the keys.
How can I perform a logic and accuracy test on the various elements/solutions of this system? Can it be conducted by election office personnel or does it require a special personnel or laboratories?
Mock elections and test votes can easily be conducted to ensure the correctness of the system. No special laboratories are required.
What type of post-election audit can be conducted on this system to verify that it worked properly? How is a recount conducted?
The encrypted ballots are optionally stored online in a database, and this can be decrypted with election officials’ keys to provide access to the individual ballots as well as the totals. Also, the original eLect Today faxes (encrypted and/or decrypted) can be stored and recounted. Postal ballots (if used) can be stored separately and recounted.
How many and what type of personnel and what effort is needed by election administrators to use eLect Today (at the state and local levels)?
In a typical project, Everyone Counts personnel provides technical consulting. Administrators need only to provide the ballot definitions (candidates and races) and the database of registered voters and their credentials. Administrators must provide one or more election officials who will have custody of the decryption keys. Administrators may also choose to appoint one or more independent auditors to receive and review copies of the eLect source code.